Chapter FORTIFY_SOURCE ended up: Enter No-Execute
I just finished the chapter on FORTIFY_SOURCE, a patch for GCC now deployed on many Linux distributions, but still used by a few (Fedora and Red Hat in particular) to protect the prebuilt packages and add an extra layer of protection against Stack, Heap and Format String Overflow. The patch is not infallible, however, in the sense that there are cases (especially in the presence of dynamically allocated buffers) that can not effectively control.
faces instead of the situation of the work done so far:
- I wrote all the time in 7 chapters for a total of 188 pages net
In the first part of the book are still missing the following topics:
- How the processor handles the mathematical calculations (in particular on the whole)
- Integer Overflow
- Description
Heap - Heap Overflow
In the second part but I still talk about:
- No-Execute Protection
- Propolice
- Advanced Exploitation of Heap Overflow
I think to proceed in this way. The next chapter which I will be No-Execute. Then I will remove half of the Integer Overflow, propolis and then talk about the end I pulled a whole heap with the issues.
Estimated time at the end of the text: I frankly do not know. I hope by the end of February but is more likely March. Depend very much on the workloads that will have to endure in recent weeks.
Greetings.
Monday, January 26, 2009
Sunday, January 11, 2009
Numbness And Tingling In Hands With New Job
Chapter 13: first steps
I returned from holiday a few days now and I immediately set to work to complete the chapter on Format String Overflow remained outstanding. Completed this I'm now jumping directly to Chapter 13 always connected to the same theme but having a view of kernel 2.6. In their method of exploitation, in some distros do not change anything apart from the need to guess where the shellcode is placed (obstacle that we have already seen how to overcome sull'ASLR in Chapter 11). Things are complicated a little bit instead on those distributions or those architectures that support the NX and become even more complex in the case of vulnerable applications compiled with FORTIFY_SOURCE = 2. These are the scenarios which will be discussed in chapter 3. Everything will be completed (hopefully) with a case of real vulnerability.
I returned from holiday a few days now and I immediately set to work to complete the chapter on Format String Overflow remained outstanding. Completed this I'm now jumping directly to Chapter 13 always connected to the same theme but having a view of kernel 2.6. In their method of exploitation, in some distros do not change anything apart from the need to guess where the shellcode is placed (obstacle that we have already seen how to overcome sull'ASLR in Chapter 11). Things are complicated a little bit instead on those distributions or those architectures that support the NX and become even more complex in the case of vulnerable applications compiled with FORTIFY_SOURCE = 2. These are the scenarios which will be discussed in chapter 3. Everything will be completed (hopefully) with a case of real vulnerability.
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